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Constitutional Considerations of the
Children's Television Act of 1988:
Why the President's Veto Was
Warranted
by DAVID S. VERSFELT*
In the years since the 1984 Broadcast Deregulation Order' of
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), Congress
has addressed a multitude of proposals regarding children's
television.2 Numerous bills introduced in both the House and
Senate have, in one or more ways, sought to reinstitute some
sort of governmental supervision over the content of children's programming and the advertising that supports it.'
* Partner, Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York, New York; Counsel
to the American Association of Advertising Agencies, Inc. The author
wishes to
thank Michele M. Jette, Member of the New York bar, for her assistance
on this
Article.
1. The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements and Programming Log Requirements for Commercial
Television
Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984) [hereinafter "1984 Deregulation Order"];
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), rev'd
in part
sub nom, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
2. The term "children's television" is typically used to refer to broadcast
television programming intended to be viewed primarily by an audience of children.
Ironically, the term is in many ways a misnomer. For example, many prime-time
programs attract an audience that consists largely of youthful viewers,
and those
same programs are often seen by more children than programming presented
during
the daytime hours. Herein, the term "children's television" will be used in
the sense
it appears in the Children's Television Act of 1988, i.e., to refer to broadcast
programming disseminated for viewing by audiences consisting of children
under the
age of 12.
3. These proposals have included limiting the quantity of advertising allowed
during children's programming; eliminating so-called "program commercials";
requiring licensees to provide a minimum of seven hours per week of educational
and
informational children's programming; and requiring the FCC to analyze,
during license renewal review, whether a television licensee is serving "the educational
and
informational needs of children in its overall programming." See H.R.
3966, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. H3979-80 (daily ed. June 7, 1988) (Children's
Television Act of 1988); H.R. 3216, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), S. 1594, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess.
(1985) (The Children's Television Educational Act of 1985); H.R. 3288, 100th
Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987) (The Children's Television Advertising Practices Act of
1987). It is
reasonable to expect that many, if not all, of these issues will be raised in
Congress
during 1989.
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While most of these bills have failed even to emerge from
committee, much less to earn the support of a majority of the
Congress, in late 1988 Congress enacted the Children's Television Act of 1988 (the "Act")4 by a relatively wide margin.5
The Act began its legislative journey with a number of provisions that were dropped at various points along the way, so
that the final version principally consisted of two provisions.
The first would have required the FCC to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to prescribe "standards" for time devoted to
commercials during children's programming, with set limits
applicable at least from January 1, 1990, to January 1, 1993.6
The other provision dealt with the review of applications
for renewal. It would have required the FCC to consider
whether the licensee had complied with the applicable commercial time limits and "whether the licensee had served the
educational and informational needs of children in its overall
programming."7
Given the relatively limited congressional opposition to the
Act, most interested parties expected President Ronald
Reagan to approve the legislation. On November 5, 1988, however, the President exercised his pocket veto, tersely stating
that "[t]his bill simply cannot be reconciled with the freedom
of expression secured by our Constitution. '8 To the surprise
of many, and the strong disappointment of a few, the legislation died.
4. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 CONG. REC. H3979-80 (daily ed. June 7,
1988) [the "Act"].

5. The House of Representatives passed the measure, 328 to 78, on June 8. 134
CONG. REC. H4010 (daily ed. June 8, 1988). The Senate gave its approval on October
19 by an unrecorded voice vote that could have been prevented, or at least delayed, if
any Senator had opposed it. 134 CONG. REC. S16857 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).
6. The limits are set forth in the statute as "not more than 10.5 minutes per
hour on weekends and not more than 12 minutes per hour on weekdays." The Act,
supra note 4, at § 3(b). The Act granted the FCC authority to modify the time limits
after January 1, 1993, following notice, public comment, and demonstration of a

"need" for a change. Id.
7. The Act, supra note 4, at § 4. As originally introduced, the bill would not
only have limited the advertising during "children's programming" but would have
required broadcasters to air a minimum of seven hours of educational and informational children's programming per week, with five of the hours falling during weekdays. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, CHILDREN'S TELEVISION PRACTICES
ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 675, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988).
8. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Children's Television Act of 1988, 24
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1456 (Nov. 5, 1988).
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A number of the proposals which played a part in the legislative journey of the Act have already been introduced this
year, placing issues regarding regulation of the content and advertising of children's television once again at the forefront.9
This Article will review some of the history and provisions of
the Act and will argue that President Reagan's veto was
appropriate, albeit not fully explained, because significant
questions regarding the Act's purported justification and the
constitutionality of certain of its restrictions existed.
The Background of the Act
The FCC has involved itself with children's programming issues for more than two decades. In 1974, Commission regulation reached a high-water mark with the Children's Television
Report and Policy Statement (the "1974 Policy Statement "),10
which concluded that broadcasters have a "special obligation"
to serve children as a "substantial and important" group in the
community.1 ' In addition to several general programming
goals,' 2 the Commission set a limit of no more than 12 minutes
per hour of advertising on weekday children's programs and
9.5 minutes per hour for weekend programming.' 3
In 1984, however, the FCC engaged in a broad deregulation
of the television industry after determining that "marketplace
forces can better determine appropriate commercial levels
than our own rules," and that the policy reasons underlying
many of its strict regulations were no longer valid. 14 The FCC
eliminated commercialization guidelines for television, including pre-existing guidelines for advertising during children's
programming."' With respect to advertising for children's pro9. Legislation identical to the Act was introduced in both the House of Repre-

sentatives and the Senate in 1989. H.R. 1677, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989); S.707,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). Other, very similar legislation has also been introduced.
E.g., S. 1215, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
10. 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter "1974 Policy Statement"], aff'd sub nom.,
Action for Children's Television v..
FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 5.
12. The general programming goals encouraged broadcasters to provide educational children's programming, expressed concern with "overcommercialization" of
children's television, and requested broadcasters to separate program matter from
commercial matter. Id. at 5-6, 10-11, 16-17.
13. Id. at 12.
14. 1984 Deregulation Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076-78, 1102 (1984).
15. The FCC's 1984 Deregulation Order removed: (1) program guideline percentages; (2) obligations that commercial broadcasters formally ascertain important
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gramming, the FCC noted "the importance of advertising as
a support mechanism for the presentation of children's
' 16
programming.
The FCC's 1984 DeregulationOrder was based on the recognition that events since 1969 had wrought dramatic changes in
how children's programming-and its attendant advertisingare disseminated. Traditionally, government regulation of the
broadcasting industry has been based on the notion of the
"scarce" number of available airways,' but this rationale is no
longer valid. The children's programming available in the
broadcasting world of 1974 bears little relationship to those
available in the broadcast, cable, and video world of today.
Developments over the past 15 years have provided a wide
variety of alternatives for children; the number of traditional
broadcasting stations has dramatically increased," and the adneeds and problems affecting their local communities; (3) guidelines limiting the
amount of allowable advertising; (4) the obligation that stations keep comprehensive
program logs, and that those logs be available for public inspection; and (5) longform audit procedures. Id. at 1076-78.
16. Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, 371
(1986) [hereinafter "Reconsideration Order"], rev'd in part sub nom., Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The FCC issued this opinion after a number of interested parties, including Action
for Children's Television ("ACT") and the National Association of Broadcasters
("NAB"), sought reconsideration and/or clarification of the 1984 DeregulationOrder.
The 1984 Deregulation Order, as clarified by the ReconsiderationOrder, is currently
being reviewed by the FCC pursuant to the decision in Action for Children'sTelevision, which remanded to the Commission that portion of the 1984 Deregulation Order relating to commercialization guidelines. Action for Children's Television, 821
F.2d at 750. The Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC had failed to provide sufficient justification for its decision to delete those guidelines as they applied to
children's television and remanded to the Commission "for further elaboration on
that issue." Id.
17. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969). In closing, the
Court stated, "[iun view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies . . . we hold the
regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by statute and constitutional." Id. at 400.
In 1987, the FCC determined that the scarcity rationale underlying Red Lion was
no longer applicable and therefore concluded that the Fairness Doctrine contravenes
the first amendment. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5057 (1987) (order
and opinion); aff'd on other grounds, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
18. In January 1975, there were 953 stations on the air; at the end of 1987, there
were 1342. This 40% growth has resulted in households having a wide variety of
choices in commercial stations. See Commercialization of Children's Television:
Hearingson H.R. 3966 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 276 (1988) [hereinafter "Hearings"] (statement of Wallace Jorgenson, President, Jefferson-Pilot Communications Co., and Chairman of the Joint Board of the NAB).
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vent of cable television and video casette recorders ("VCR")
have resulted in a highly competitive market that provides
children and parents with an abundance of choices.' 9
In light of this dynamic and competitive market, the FCC's
1984 Deregulation Order determined that the marketplace was
adequately protecting children from "overcommercialization."
The Commission's precise reasoning was that "if stations exceed the tolerance level of viewers by adding 'too many' commercials, the market will regulate itself, i.e., the viewers will
not watch and the advertisers will not buy time."2
Following the FCC's 1984 Deregulation Order, a number of
groups, principally Action for Children's Television ("ACT"),
began pressing Congress to reinstate the Commission's guidelines for television, particularly the guidelines for children's
programming set forth in the 1974 Policy Statement. The
premise for such regulation is the same as the premise underlying the 1974 Policy Statement: that "spectrum scarcity" requires the Commission to regulate actively in the area of
children's television.2 '
In the resulting Children's Television Act of 1988, Congress
agreed with ACT that "commercialism" had increased since
1984 and concluded that "total reliance on marketplace forces
is not sufficient to protect children from potential exploitation
by advertising or commercial practices.

'22

The House Report

accompanying the Act explicitly noted the Act's goal of turning back the clock:
The purpose of this legislation is much the same as that
reflected by the FCC's policy in 1974: "to protect the interest
of children by limiting the amount of commercial matter
presented during children's programs to the greatest extent
19. In 1974, the VCR had not even been introduced in the United States; today,
59% of all households with children under 12 years of age have at least one VCR.

Cable television also plays a major role today in children's viewing habits. AGB Television Research shows that 52.7% of television households with children under 12
have cable television service. Hearings,supra note 18, at 289-92 (report of Richard
V. Ducey, Ph.D., submitted by Wallace Jorgenson, President, Jefferson-Pilot Communications Co., and Chairman of the Joint Board of the NAB).
20. 1984 Deregulation Order, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1105 (footnote omitted).
21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
22. H.R. REP. No. 675, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 134 CONG. REC. H3979-80 (daily ed.
June 7, 1988). Although the House Report accompanying the Act recognized the
new media available today for children, it concluded, without explanation, that these
alternatives did not obviate the public interest responsibility of individual broadcast
licensees. Id.
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possible without negatively impacting the viability of children's programming on commercial television."23

The First Amendment Context
The fallacy of any congressional desire to return to the days
of the 1974 Policy Statement is demonstrated not only in the
recent explosion of competing media, but also by the substantial changes in first amendment law which have occurred since
1974. In considering the Act, Congress relied heavily on the
FCC's 1974 Policy Statement for conclusions that children are
"far more trusting of and vulnerable to commercial 'pitches'
than are adults" and that "the public interest does not protect
advertising which is substantially in excess of the amount"
needed to produce children's programs.2 4

Congress, however,

was insensitive to the fact that the Commission's 1974 conclusions were reached in a first amendment context radically different from that of today.
The 1974 Policy Statement rested explicitly upon the
premise that "commercial speech has little first amendment
protection."2 5 That conclusion was based on the then-prevailing Supreme Court view, enunciated in Valentine v.
Chrestensen,26 that "the Constitution imposes no restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising. ' 27 The
view that commercial speech falls outside of first amendment
purview, however, has not been the law since the Supreme
Court's 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.28
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court repudiated the Chrestensen dogma 29 and invalidated a state statute which prohibited
pharmacists from advertising prices of prescription drugs. The
Court found that suppression of "truthful information about
entirely lawful activity" was repugnant to the first amendment." Since 1976, the Court has consistently invalidated re23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 7, 9.
25. 1974 Policy Statement; 50 F.C.C.2d at 10.
26. 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (refusing to enjoin enforcement of ordinance against street
distribution of handbills containing commercial matter).
27. Id. at 54.
28. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
29. Id. at 760-61.
30. Id. at 773. The Court noted the importance of commercial speech in American society, stating:
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strictions intended to deprive consumers of accurate
information about products and services that are, and traditionally have been, lawful. 3
Of course, the courts have long recognized Congress' authority generally to regulate broadcasting "in the public interest,
convenience and necessity" by means of FCC rules and regulations.32 In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized congressional power to regulate programming aimed at children,
even where the exercise would be prohibited by the first
3
amendment if the programming were aimed at adults.
Nevertheless, to recognize congressional authority to institute
appropriate regulations in the area is not to concede that Congress may regulate in whatever manner or degree it pleases.
The Supreme Court set forth an explicit statement of the
standards for first amendment protection of commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York.34 In Central Hudson, the
Court ruled that New York State could not ban utility advertising that promoted consumer use of electricity. Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, formulated a four-part test for
determining whether a proposed restriction on commercial
speech passes constitutional muster:
Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though entirely
"commercial," may be of general public interest ....
Advertising, however

tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination
of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price ....

It is a matter of public interest that those

decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 764-65.
31. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328 (1986); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988) (invalidated a
restriction on direct mail efforts by attorneys); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (struck down an attorney advertising restriction);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (invalidated postal regulation which banned from the mails unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives); In
re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (invalidating regulations on lawyer advertising);
States v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (invalidated ban on advertising of
prices by private attorneys); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(struck down an ordinance prohibiting the posting of real estate "For Sale" signs).
See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating restrictions on contraceptive advertising).
32. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969).
33. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsburg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
34. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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1. Whether the activity being advertised is lawful and free of
misleading claims;
2. Whether the government has a substantial interest favoring restriction;
3. Whether the restriction directly advances that substantial
governmental interest; and
4. Whether the restriction is no more extensive than necessary to further the governmental interest.3 5
Central Hudson's standards provided the framework for
evaluation of proposed restrictions on commercial speech in a
series of Supreme Court decisions since 1980.36 The Supreme
Court re-affirmed the CentralHudson standards in Posadasde
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 7 which upheld a Puerto Rican statutory restriction intended to permit
advertising for local casinos except where the advertising was
intended exclusively for an audience of Puerto Rican residents. Although some proponents of restrictions on commercial speech have argued that the strength of Central Hudson
did not survive Posadas, a careful review of the case suggests
that this is not so. The Posadas Court explicitly relied on the
standards set forth in Central Hudson."' Admittedly, the
Court's inquiry into the Central Hudson test was less searching than in prior cases, but this may be explained by the
unique procedural posture and social context surrounding the
case. First, Posadaspresented a challenge limited to the facial
validity of the statute, not to the statute as applied. Also, the
statute at issue had originally been promulgated in 1948 as
part of the Commonwealth's decision to legalize casino gambling on the island and, in reaching its holding, the Court expressly noted "the unique cultural and legal history of Puerto
Rico."39 Finally, the Court pointedly relied on the fact that
"the vast majority of the 50 States .

.

. prohibit casino gam-

35. Id. at 566. Central Hudson set forth the final part of its standard in terms of
whether the government restriction was "no more extensive than necessary." Since
then the Court has clarified that the standard requires that the government's means
be "narrowly tailored" to achieve the desired ends. Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox, - U.S. -, 57 U.S.L.W. 5015, 5018 (June 29, 1989).
36. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203-207; Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68-75; Zauderer,471
U.S. at 644-47; Posadas,478 U.S. at 343; Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921; Board of Trustees
of the State University of New York v. Fox, - U.S. at -, 57 U.S.L.W. at 5015.
37. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
38. Id. at 340-44.
39. Id. at 339 n.6.
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bling. ' ' 40 At bottom, Posadas can best be understood as an application of Central Hudson's standards in a special context,
involving a product that had been unlawful far longer than it
had been lawful, and restrictions on advertising that were part
and parcel of a legislative decision to legalize the product.
Viewing Posadas in this light, one can clearly see its inapplicability to the circumstances of children's programming. Television programs aimed at children have always been lawful
and the advertising supporting such programming has always
been viewed as a worthy means of providing the financial support needed to continue the programming. Indeed, Congress
noted in the Act the lawful purposes of broadcast advertising
to children, while explicitly finding that "the financial support
of advertisers assists in the provision of programming to children. ' ' 41 Additionally, in the 1987 Court of Appeals decision

remanding the children's programming portions of the 1984
Deregulation Order to the FCC, the court expressly recognized that "it is clear that any regulation of programming
42
must be reconciled with free speech considerations.

The first amendment protection afforded commercial speech
requires any governmental restriction on advertising to be
evaluated against the tests set forth in Central Hudson. What
follows is an analysis under Central Hudson of each of the
substantial proposals incorporated either directly or indirectly
into the Act.
Time Limits for Advertising During Children's

Programming
Section 3(b) of the Act required "commercial television
broadcast licensees to limit the duration of advertising in children's programming .

.

. to not more than 10.5 minutes per

hour on weekends and not more than 12 minutes per hour on
weekdays .

. . ."

As a result of the Act's facial restriction on

commercial speech, the Central Hudson standards require the
government to demonstrate a substantial need for the regulation before such a limitation can pass constitutional scrutiny.43
40. Id. at 341.
41. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(3), 134 CONG. REC. H3739-80 (daily ed.
June 7, 1988).
42. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741, 743 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
43. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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Based upon the hearing record adduced in connection with the
Act, it is doubtful that Congress made the requisite showing.
There is nothing inherently or per se harmful about the
advertising of products or services on television. Critics of
particular types of advertising are typically motivated by an
opposition to particular products and are attacking the advertising only because of the legislative impracticality of banning
the products themselves. Yet, the first amendment precludes
using restrictions on advertising as indirect substitutes for restrictions on the sale of products themselves. 4 Absent a clear
showing of harm to children-and therefore "a substantial
government interest" in minimizing that harm-no restrictive
regulation can withstand constitutional scrutiny under Central
Hudson. The current evidence on advertising in and around
children's programming fails to meet this burden. Proponents
of the Act frequently state that excessive commercialization is
detrimental to children, 45 but the evidence is far from convincing and fails to clearly show how the harm results. 46 Proponents of the Act argued that it is somehow "unfair" to
advertise to children too young to discern the difference between programming and advertising. 47 However, there is vast
disagreement regarding the age at which children discern the
difference between programs and advertisements. There is no
agreement about whether that lack of cognitive ability actually affects children in any substantive manner, and there is
44. As the Court emphasized in Virginia Pharmacy Board, restrictions on the
flow of commercial information cannot be justified by a "paternalistic approach" of
having the government rest its restriction "on the advantages of [its citizens] being
kept in ignorance." 425 U.S. 752, 769-70 (1942).
45. Hearings,supra note 18, at 197-98 (testimony of Dr. Ellen Wartella, Research
Associate Professor, University of Illinois, representing Society for Research in
Child Development); id. at 94, 102-108 (testimony of Dale Kunkel, Professor, University of California, Santa Barbara).
46. Although there is evidence that "young children" may be unable to differentiate between advertising and programming, evidence as to what "harmful" effects
might result is, at best, very inconclusive. Indeed, reliable evidence exists that
young children can perceptually discriminate between programs and commercials
and can discern the purposes of advertising. See WARD, WACKMAN & WARTELL,
How CHILDREN LEARN To BuY 54 (1977). See also WARD & WACKMAN, EFFECTS OF
TELEVISED ADVERTISING ON CONSUMER SOCIALIZATION 46 (1973).
47. H.R. REP. No. 675, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988) (relying on the 1974 Policy
Statement); Hearings,supra note 18 at 340 (statement of the New York City Dept.
of Consumer Affairs); id. at 189-98 (statement of Dr. Ellen Wartella, Research Associate Professor, University of Illinois, representing Society for Research in Child Development); id. at 97-99 (statement of Dale Kunkel, Professor, University of
California, Santa Barbara).
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no evidence that parents fail to provide an effective check on
the desires of their children to buy products advertised during
children's shows.4 8
Even if one accepts the theory that regulating children's
programming will advance a substantial interest in preventing
"harm" or "unfairness" to children, any proposal to limit advertising in children's programming to 9.5 minutes or 12 minutes per hour must be shown to "directly advance" this
interest. 49 Ironically, an argument made in support of the
Act-that its time restrictions were either at, or not far from,
present practices-suggests that the Act attempts little to "directly advance" any asserted government interest. Of course,
any "harm" that advertising per se is assumed to cause children would continue to occur during the advertising periods
permitted under the Act.5 °
Furthermore, the Act's limits on commercials do not appear
to meet Central Hudson's fourth and final requirement that a
regulation be "no more extensive than necessary to further
the governmental interest."'" First, it is questionable whether
such regulation is truly necessary at this time, as the current
marketplace acts to minimize excessive commercialization.
While some complain that commercial levels during children's
programming have increased following the 1984 Deregulation
Order,52 most studies show that the majority of commercial
48. DISSENTING VIEWS ON H.R. 3966, THE CHILDREN'S TELEVISION ACT, H.R. REP.
No. 675, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1988).
49. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
50. This is not the first time that an argument has been advanced that advertising to children is somehow "unfair." In 1978, the Federal Trade Commission staff
advanced the notion that to the extent advertising was "unfair" when directed at
children, it could be effectively dealt with by means of a total ban on such advertisements. In 1980, Congress, recognizing the first amendment law that truthful advertising for a lawful product or service cannot be restricted except under specific and
stringent conditions, forbade the Commission to go further unless it could support a
finding of deception. See 15 U.S.C. 57a, § 11(a)(1)(i). In light of this directive, the
Commission terminated its rulemaking, stating: "The staff has suggested that the
only effective remedy for the problems allegedly posed by child-oriented television
advertising would be a ban on all advertisement aimed at young children, but concludes that such a remedy could not be implemented as a practical matter since its
coverage would be both over and under-inclusive." Children's Television Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,710, 48,714 (1981) (termination of rulemaking proceeding).
51. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
52. H.R. REP. No. 675, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 8-9 (1988); Hearings,supra note 18
at 93-94, 110-17 (testimony and report of Dale Kunkel, Professor, University of California, Santa Barbara).
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TV stations are, in fact, at or below the level which the Act
53
would have mandated.

Additionally, strong arguments can be made that a limited
lifting of antitrust regulations would provide a less intrusive
means of dealing with concerns about "excessive" advertising
to children. Currently, the antitrust restrictions prohibit
broadcasters and others from adopting a self-regulation
scheme such as the one promulgated by the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB").54 Prior to 1982, the NAB had
provided an industry code which included restrictions on the
quantity, type and placement of children's advertising (the
"Code"). The Code contained limitations similar to those in
the Act on the number of advertisements permitted during
children's programming.55 In practice, the Code Authority,
which was established pursuant to the Code, exercised final
control over advertising because neither the networks nor
most local stations would air non-Code approved commercials.
The Department of Justice, however, brought an end to selfregulation when it maintained an antitrust action against the
NAB and its members. 56 The resulting consent judgment pro53. A survey conducted by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
found that the average children's program contained slightly more than 8.5 minutes
per hour of commercial advertising and that 9 out of 10 programs contained fewer
than 12 commercial minutes per hour. E. Cohen, "NAB Children's Television Commercialization Survey," Research and Planning Department, National Association of
Broadcasters (February 1988) (available from NAB); Hearings,supra note 18, at 279
(statement of Wallace Jorgenson, President, Jefferson-Pilot Communications Co.,
and Chairman of the Joint Board of the NAB).
Proponents of the Act rely on a study conducted by Dale Kunkel, a professor at
the University of California, Santa Barbara, to support their contention that advertising has increased since the FCC's 1984 Deregulation Order. The Kunkel study,
however, confirms the data found by the NAB. An examination of the Kunkel study
shows that when one eliminates public service announcements, promotions for upcoming programs, and news snippets from the "non-program material," the stations
surveyed averaged 10.5 minutes of product ads, approximating the guidelines in the
Act. See id. at 26-27 (statement of Preston R. Padden, President, ITVA).
54. The suggestion presented here was, in fact, proposed by Representative
Thomas J. Tauke in H.R. 4125, which would have allowed an antitrust exemption to
broadcasting entities for the purpose of developing and disseminating voluntary
guidelines on the scope of children's broadcast advertising.
55. Under the NAB Code, advance scripts and storyboards, as well as final commercials, were subjected to review and approval by the NAB Code Authority. See
United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
56. Id. The Justice Department alleged that the broadcasters' limits on children's programming commercials restricted the supply of commercial availability
and, hence, increased prices. Id. at 152. The court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment with respect to the time standards and program interruption
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hibits broadcasters from "adopting, maintaining, promulgating,
publishing, distributing, enforcing, monitoring or otherwise requiring or suggesting adherence to, any code, rule, bylaw, standard or other provision limiting or restricting: (1) the
quantity, length or placement of non-program material appearing on broadcast television .... - In other words, since
1982, broadcasters have been prohibited from agreeing among
themselves to limit the amount of commercial material aired
in and around children's programs.5"
By allowing the industry itself to deal with specific issues
regarding "excessive commercialization," Congress could
achieve the purported goal of the Act with less intrusive interference with first amendment rights. Although some opponents will always argue that market forces are inadequate to
meet the Act's goals, the evidence suggests that Congress
should certainly consider this less restrictive alternative to the
Act. Central Hudson suggests that any viable self-regulatory
means of approaching the issue must be preferred to the governmental intrusions mandated in the Act.

The Act's Rulemaking Requirement and Program
Length Commercials
Section 3(a) of the Act provided:
Rulemaking on Commercial Time Required.-The Federal
Communications Commission shall, within 30 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, initiate a rulemaking proceeding to prescribe standards applicable to commercial television
broadcast licensees with respect to the time devoted to commercial matter in conjunction with children's television
programming.
The rulemaking requirement of the Act gives the Commission
power to set commercial time limits but completely fails to
give guidance on the issue of how to categorize animated features involving cartoon characters simultaneously marketed as
products. Opponents of this advertising practice call these
standards. Id. at 170. Thereafter, the parties entered into a consent decree. See
United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp 621, 622 (D.D.C. 1982).
57. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. at 626.
58. Some have also opposed reinstitution of the Code on the basis that it is essentially "a back-door device for delegating [to the NAB] authority to administer a
legislative policy of First Amendment transgression." Hearings, supra note 18, at
232 (testimony of Gilbert H. Weil, general counsel of the Association of National
Advertisers).
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Clearly, if limitations are to

be established by the Commission regarding the number of
minutes of "commercials" which can be shown in a given halfhour, any program defined entirely as "commercial" would
effectively be banned. While no one has yet been able to
provide a reasoned definition of what exactly constitutes a
"program length commercial, ' 59 proponents of such a ban argue that so-called "toy driven" shows are detrimental to
children.
Such an argument clearly goes too far. These programs can
and do stand alone on their ability to entertain. Neither is
there something inherently undesirable about a program that
features characters that may simultaneously be sold as products. A wide variety of highly acclaimed children's programs,
ranging from "commercial" programs (such as Walt Disney
broadcasts) to various "non-commercial" programs (such as
Sesame Street), have been and continue to be associated with
specific products." If a show provides entertaining and informative programming, its sponsors should not be precluded
from selling toys which replicate characters in the programming, either during the program itself or at other times. To
hold otherwise would deal a severe blow to much current children's programming.
Contrary to the contentions of opponents to "commercial
programs," children are not so gullible that they continue to
watch a program that does not have sufficient entertainment
value.6 1 This is borne out by the declining audience for "action
59. One must question whether there exists any rational and constitutional
means by which the FCC or Congress can distinguish this kind of programming. It
may well be that, if any method exists, it is best pursued in a forum like an FCC
Rulemaking which is already pending, which at a minimum allows extensive public
comment and analysis before dramatic encroachments into first amendment rights
are taken. See In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 6822, 23 (1987) (further notice of inquiry and notice of
proposed rule making).
60. Indeed, Sesame Street-which is perhaps the most acclaimed program broadcast for the children's audience-has been reported to derive approximately twothirds of its revenue from dolls, puppets, games, books, clothing, and other products.
Blau, "Mum's the Word, But Sesame Street is Turning 20," N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1988, at C13, col. 5.
61. As one noted commentator recently stated:
We must stop treating children as helpless, gullible sheep who need to be
carefully watched and protected. There is no evidence that television is the
wolf in sheep's clothing that is slowly devouring our children, though many
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figure" programs and the greater demand for family-oriented
or standard cartoon programs. 62 Because the audience determines the success or failure of children's programming, the
marketplace will react to such findings and will eliminate
programs that are not sufficiently entertaining to sustain an
audience.

The Act's Requirement that Licensees Serve the
Interest of Children
The last provision of the Act required the FCC to consider,
in reviewing renewal applications, "whether the licensee had
served the educational and informational needs of children in
its overall programming. '63 If the Act is simply reiterating the
Commission's long-standing policy that broadcasters have a responsibility to major segments of its audience, then the regulation is superfluous because it does nothing to change existing
law.6 4
If, instead, the Act is intended to push the FCC beyond its
present practices, the broad wording of the provision offers little guidance for broadcasters or the Commission. Re-licensing
issues are complex and varied and the Act omits any standards
for such inevitable factual issues as: (i) what children are a
part of the broadcaster's audience; (ii) what are the "educational and informational" needs of those children and how are
they to be measured; (iii) what measures define a broadcaster's "overall programming;" and (iv) what standards,
whether qualitative or quantitative, will define sufficient "service" of children's needs.
If the review provision is actually a trial balloon for future
congressional mandates of specific quantities of educational
critics would have you believe that. Children are not that easy to entertain
or persuade, they will not watch [everything] put in front of them on televi-

sion, and will not buy [or ask to buy] everything that is cleverly advertised
to them. In reality, children are intelligent, discriminating, and skeptical.
Despite their lack of experience, they are not that easily fooled.
C.

SCHNEIDER, CHILDREN'S TELEVISION:

THE ART, THE BUSINESS, AND

HOW IT

WORKS 2 (1987).
62. Hearings,supra note 18, at 280-281 (statement of Wallace Jorgenson, Presi-

dent Jefferson-Pilot Communciations Co., and Chairman of the Joint Board of the
NAB).

63. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(2), 134 CONG. REC. H3979-80 (daily ed.
June 7, 1988).
64. See 1984 Deregulation Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1984); Reconsideration
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, 363-64 (1986).
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and informational programming for children,65 Congress
should be forewarned that such initiatives would raise serious
first amendment difficulties.66 While proponents attempt to
couch such regulation as "content-neutral," the inability to
define what is "educational" or "informational"67 would inevitably give the Commission supervisory control over programming content-in essence, a right to engage in program
censorship, a concept long repugnant to the first amendment.68

Conclusion
Prior to its passage, proponents of the Children's Television
Act of 1988 asserted that it did not go far enough to re-regulate the area of 'children's programming and advertising. The
Act appeared to do little more than limit commercial time
during children's shows to levels essentially the same as current practice and to direct broadcasters to continue to serve
the needs of children. Upon closer review, however, the seemingly innocuous provisions of the Act raise substantial issues
regarding the asserted need for the legislation, the scope of
the restrictions proposed, and the wisdom of future rulemaking proceedings mandated without adequate congressional guidance. While President Reagan's veto message may not have
fully explained the reasons for his opposition to the Act, the
65. Although not part of the final version of the Act, a requirement that broadcasters air a minimum of seven hours of educational and informational children's
programming per week, was part of the bill as originally introduced. H.R. REP. No.
675, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 134 CONG. REC. H3979-80 (daily ed. June 8, 1988).
66. In 1984, the FCC rejected mandatory programming requirements for children's television, based on the fundamental first amendment problems associated
with the Commission's interference with broadcasters' editorial discretion, combined
with the practicality of attempting to resolve problems of quality by mandating
quantity. Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d
634, 655-56 (1984) (report and order).
67. As the FCC has noted, "[J]udgments concerning the suitability of particular
types of programs for children are highly subjective." See Nat'l Ass'n of Indep. Television Program Producers and Directors v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 539 n.21 (2nd Cir.
1975).
68. Numerous judicial opinions have noted that serious first amendment concerns are raised when regulation intrudes into broadcasters' programming judgments. See Nat'l Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers, 516 F.2d at 536 ("It may be
that mandatory programming by the Commission even in categories would raise serious First Amendment questions .... ) WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d
838, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("There would no doubt be severe statutory and constitutional difficulties with any system that required intrusive governmental surveillance
[or] dictated programming choices ....").See also Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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veto is entirely consistent with a careful approach to first
amendment issues in the area of children's programming and
commercial advertising. One hopes that those individuals and
groups pressing for reenactment of similar legislation in 1989
will prove as sensitive to first amendment concerns as was
President Reagan.

